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Bornschier, Simon

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Simon Bornschier
University of Zurich
siborn@ipz.uzh.ch

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Introduction

The European experience of cleavage formation differs from that in many new democracies in that large-scale processes of social transformation (like state formation and industrialization) often did non coincide with suffrage extensions in the latter. This often hindered the formation of collective identities based on class and religion, meaning that cleavages in new democracies are often more political than sociological in nature. This, in turn, implies that political leadership at critical junctures has tended to be more important, producing more diverse outcomes in terms of the nature of political divides that in Western Europe. A further element in new democracies that makes the link between social divisions and those represented in the party system more tenuous is that competition tends to be less open. For example, restrictions on the participation of left-wing parties can suppress economic cleavages at the advantage of cultural ones.

But party systems in more recent democracies are not uniformly less anchored in social divisions. Rather, they exhibit much more variance in this

respect as compared to the older democracies. It is this variance that we should exploit in order to learn more about the conditions that make for discrepancies between social divisions and party system divisions.

In the first section of this short paper, I start out with a few reflections on the cleavage concept and in particular on the idea of a mass-elite divergence in political cleavages. Both the initial formation, as well as the subsequent perpetuation of cleavages involves top-down and bottom-up processes. Agency is always crucial, also in the old democracies, and assessing mass-elite *divergences* is therefore not an easy task. Acknowledging that representation is a dynamic process, the approach I have taken is to measure to which degree party systems are responsive to voters' substantive policy preferences, which I call *party system responsiveness*.

In the second section, I say something about possible differences between the old and more recent democracies, drawing on my work on the historical origins of party system responsiveness in Latin America. In explaining country differences, I argue that the initial formation of responsive party systems is decisive. In this process, the degree of political polarization is crucial, because when polarization is strong, it creates the political identities that anchor party systems in the populace – the kind of anchoring implied in the term cleavage. The impact of historical polarization is enduring because party systems built on strong links between parties and social groups tend to adapt to new demands and social change, much like those in the older democracies.

In the third section, I address a third issue highlighted in the background paper I was asked to comment on, namely, how parties position themselves on competitive dimensions that are secondary to their main ideological appeal (Section III-2-D, entitled "Irresponsible and Inconsistent Commitment on Socio-economic Issues: Beyond East Asia). My focus here is on the populist right in Western Europe.

1. Cleavages and agency

The appeal of the cleavage concept lies in its capacity to link individual and group political behavior to large scale-divisions in society. In my reading, mobilization from below and from above invariably interact in cleavage formation. In order to engage in collective political action, voters need interpretative frames that allow them to interpret grievances and form preferences and collective identities based on common social-structural positions (see also Tarrow 1992). Leadership by elites, in other words, is crucial, as many cleavage theorists highlight (e.g., Enyedi 2005; Deegan-Krause 2006; Zuckerman 1975). Beyond the collective action problem, elite agency is also crucial because every individual belong to multiple groups that are potentially relevant politically. Following Stryker (1980, 2000), we can think of identities such as those linked to class, religion, or ethnicity as arranged in a hierarchy of salience. And the positions of individuals' various group memberships in this salience hierarchy is shaped, I would argue, by political conflict (Bornschier 2010; see also Coser 1956). In order for cleavages to remain salient, then, they have to engender continued conflict. Hence, political actors again take central stage. Although I would claim that agency is even more important in new democracies (I explain why below), its central role is also evident in Western European party systems, where social divisions have tended to be strongly cross-cutting. So while we find the state-market and the religious cleavages almost everywhere in Europe, the degree to which mobilized cleavages cross-cut or reinforced each other depended crucially on elite strategies (see Manow 2015).

For this reason, I am a bit reluctant to adopt the terminology of a "divergence between mass and elite cleavages", because I would reserve the term cleavage for those cases where divisions at the mass and elite levels coincide. There is a large number of divides in society that are potentially relevant in political terms, and in a view informed by Schattschneider (1975[1960]), party systems are always more responsive to some conflicts than to others. I agree with the background paper, however, in that we need not reserve the term cleavage for instances where political divides are clearly anchored in social structure. Bartolini and Mair's (1990) well-known definition is overly restrictive in this

respect, making it difficult for the cleavage concept to travel to other contexts, where political divisions are less strongly anchored in social structure and more political in nature.[1] But the restrictive definition is also inadequate for the Western European cases: Even if cleavages may have exhibited more homogeneity at the moment of their initial mobilization, their subsequent reproduction depends on the patterns of interaction in party systems, and is thus to a significant extent *genuinely political* more than social. Thus, cleavages tend to at least in part become a product of politics itself (Mair 1997, 2001; Bornschier 2010).

From the perspective of programmatic representation – or party system responsiveness, as I call it – there has been some recent theorizing that seeks to bring models of representation closer to the observed reality. In making the case for a "mobilization conception of political representation", Disch (2011) argues that our conceptions of representation needs to come to terms with the empirical finding that the influence between voters and parties is reciprocal: Parties do not simply represent voters' interests, as in Pitkin's (1967) liberal conception of representation, but they also shape their voters' very preferences and give them guidance on how to form preferences concerning new political issues.

From this point of view, what Jaemin calls a divergence of mass-elite political cleavages for me refers to contexts in which party systems lack programmatic responsiveness vis-à-vis voters. This is the terminology that I will adopt in this paper. I agree with Jaemin, on the other hand, that Bartolini and Mair's (1990) canonical definition of cleavage lacks the temporal dimension: We generally reserve the term for political divisions that are rather stable (Tóka 1998), where generations of voters are socialized into an interpretation of political grievances and conflict in terms of the major dividing lines represented by the party system.

1 Deegan-Krause (2009) offers a conceptualization of different types of divides that do not meet the criteria for full cleavages.

2. The politicization of social divisions in Latin America: Party system responsiveness in new democracies

Due to the temporal coincidence of suffrage extensions and with the mobilization of specific social groups in Western Europe, the dividing lines represented in party systems coincided with major social divisions in this context, at least until the late 1960s: All party systems in Western Europe were and continue to be responsive to at least some social divisions. Put differently, the older democracies offer little variance in this respect. We can thus learn a lot about the conditions that make party systems responsive to social conflicts, then, by looking at new democracies: The link between social divisions and those represented in the party system is more tenuous here. I see two principal reasons for this.

(1) For one thing, this is due to the *lack of coincidence between major social change and suffrage extension,* as pointed out in the background paper (p. 13). As a consequence, social identities related to religion and class are weaker for example in Latin America (for the class cleavage, it also matters that lower levels of industrialization and made for a working class that was also substantially smaller in size than in the advanced democracies at the time of suffrage expansion). Perhaps this created less pressure for representation from below than in the old democracies. On the other hand, there was also a lot of repression of bottom-up organized parties. Either the pressure was not so strong as to dissuade elites from using repression, or the capacity for repression on the part of established elites was stronger in the newer democracies than it was in early 20th century Europe.[2] The delicate balance of power between established and new actors directly affects the next issue I would like to highlight, namely, variation in the degree to which competition was open or restricted.

(2) Indeed, *competition is often restricted* in new democracies. This, in turn, is due to at least two factors: The first has to do with restrictions against specific parties. In 20th Century Latin America, these were often Communist or other

2 Both the strength of mobilization from below, as well as the capacity of the established elites to restrict completion is best thought of in terms of Dahl's (1971) trade-off between the cost of toleration of opposition vs. the costs of repression.

left-wing parties that were deemed too radical, particularly in the Cold War context or during pacted transitions to democracy, when established actors had a lot of leeway in defining the rules of the game. In the MENA region today, the same can be true for Islamist parties. In my work on Latin American party systems, I found that inhibiting left-wing parties from competing often has far-reaching and long-term implications for programmatic responsiveness. The reason is that the marginalization of competitors limits the inducements established parties have to maintain distinctive policy platforms. Without open contestation, the dynamic of competition changes: A mainstream (center-)left party challenged by a more leftist competitor is likely to lose to this competitor if it moves to the center. If contestation is restricted, on the other hand, left-leaning voters have nowhere else to go. Consequently, center-left parties do not face immediate losses when they collude with their mainstream center-right counterparts and eliminate programmatic distinctiveness. Curtailing competition also destroys parties' incentives to adapt to new social demands.

The second factor that restricts programmatic competition is the presence of non-programmatic linkages between parties and voters, as argued in the background paper. The predominance of clientelism skews the playing field between governing parties and challengers in favor of the first, using Levitsky and Way's (2010a, 2010b) terminology. Again, this limits parties' needs to adapt to new programmatic demands. The pervasiveness of clientelism in new democracies, I would argue, is often due to a lack of programmatic differentiation: Where party systems are polarized along programmatic lines, this diminishes the role of clientelism as a strategy of mobilization.

In sum, my research on party systems in Latin America showed that whether a country experienced extended periods of *polarization or whether polarization was aborted* is the key variable explaining why some party systems are more responsive to voter preferences than others even decades later (Bornschier 2016). The relevant dimensions of competition in Latin America are the state-market and the democratic regime dimension (the latter given the recent history of military dictatorships in the 1970s into the 1980s). Some party systems in the region are highly responsive to voter' programmatic preferences, while others are not. When competition was open in the first half

of the 20th Century, this generally resulted in high levels of polarization in the party system along the state-market dimension. These polarized party positions created clear alternatives for voters, and made them base their vote on their preferences vis-à-vis state intervention or market liberalism (Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina). Restrictions on the participation of left-wing parties, on the other hand, mitigated polarization. This often implied that economic cleavages were suppressed at the advantage of cultural ones (Colombia), or that party systems became anchored in clientelistic, rather than programmatic linkages (Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, and others). The most important factor[3] shaping whether competition was open and the left tolerated was the strength of the right, because this shaped the ability of conservative forces to defend their interests in the electoral arena.[4] The balance of power between left and right is thus crucial in making polarization possible, which in turn fosters responsiveness.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the economic cleavage was then often complemented by a regime divide between defenders of the prior military regimes and proponents of democracy. At times, as in Chile and Brazil, this dimension was even more important in shaping partisan alignments than the economic cleavage. Its overall effect of responsiveness was positive because the regime cleavage overlaps with, rather than crosscuts the economic cleavage (and when the regime issue became less important, the economic dimension grew in importance).

With respect to what Jaemin suggests for Taiwan, Korea and Japan, and without really knowing these countries, I would not simply rule out that regime or foreign policy divides can be more salient to voters than economic ones. We cannot read off a mass-elite discrepancy in political divisions solely from the fact that economic preferences are not politicized (just as the predominance of cultural cleavage in contemporary Western Europe for some groups of voters does not imply that party systems are cartelized, as I discuss below). The presence of left-wing parties in Japan suggests that the second mechanism depicted above – the restriction of parties' programmatic offer – was not a major factor there. On the other hand, the clientelistic nature of the

3 In Slater and Simmons' (2010) terms, it represents a "critical antecedent" because it heavily shapes, but by itself does not predict the final outcome.

4 A similar point is made with respect to democratization in Europe by Ziblatt (2017).

Japanese party system may have inhibited these parties from attaining sizeable vote shares, and from shifting the dominant dimension of competition towards a state-market cleavage.

My suggestion is that we focus not only on negative cases where the link between social divisions and party system divides is tenuous, but that we exploit the full variance and learn from those new democracies where parties are in fact responsive to voter preferences. It is this variance that allows us to learn more about the conditions that make for discrepancies between social divisions and party system divisions.

3. Irresponsible and inconsistent commitment to socio-economic issues – beyond East Asia

The Latin American cases suggest that the failure of elites to offer voters a substantive choice in economic policy making is indeed the result of party system cartelization (caused by restrictions in political competition or elites' reliance on clientelistic linkages). The same may be true, according to the background paper, in East Asia. But the situation is quite different in the old democracies. Competition is genuinely open here. For those supporting the radical populist right in Western Europe, the economic dimension is indeed secondary to the cultural one. These voters' anti-universalistic preferences are represented well by right-wing populist parties. Along the economic dimension, these parties have come to occupy centrist or center-left positions (with the exception of the Swiss People's Party), a position that has brought them closer to their core voters from the manual working class (see Bornschier 2018 for an overview of the literature). If people vote for these parties, it is because they are better agents to represent their preferences than mainstream parties, and not because party systems are in any way cartelized.

There is a clear difference between the new democracies I have been talking about and the older ones in Western Europe, then, in that clientelism is far less important (with the possible exception of Southern Europe), and that competition is not restricted. The mushrooming of new parties in Europe

clearly suggests that the cartelization thesis is mistaken. Most of the new parties are not simply anti-establishment parties, but advocate clear stances on substantive policy dimensions.

In other words, the polarization of the new cultural divide in Western Europe is indeed diminishing the salience of the economic state-market dimension for parts of the electorate. But it is not curtailing voter choice – there are plenty of radical left and left-wing populist parties around to represent voters with state interventionist views. The new cultural conflict between the universalism of the New Left and the populist right's traditionalist-communitarian counter-model is simply more salient to many voters than the traditional economic cleavage. Economic preferences may not be irrelevant for those for whom the cultural dimension is prime, but they are in part interpreted by these voters in cultural terms (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). In line with what Schattschneider (1975 [1960]) wrote, politics is still a struggle about meaning, and more specifically, about the interpretation of what the relevant dimensions of conflict are. If voters perceive cultural divisions as more salient than economic ones, then party systems in the advanced democracies may offer quite good representation. This is in fact what the evidence suggests (Bornschier 2010, 2015). Thus, we might be witnessing some degree of discrepancy between the "objective" interests that we read off voters' social structural location, and party choice. But whether we like it or not, in terms of representing voters' substantive policy preferences, many Western European party systems perform pretty well.

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